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Abstract
We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised negation-complete and thus disjunc-
tive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP) from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or
instant interactive proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are negation-complete
(maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the
disjunction property (like Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are ultraﬁlters
and all internalised proof goals are deﬁnite in the sense of being either provable or disprovable to an agent
by means of disjunctive internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself is clas-
sical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not have the disjunction property. The
price to pay for the negation completeness of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-
communality (for singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a standard
Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP’s and then construct in terms of
a concrete oracle-computable function. LDiiP’s agent-centric internalised notion of proof can also be viewed
as a negation-complete disjunctive explicit reﬁnement of standard KD45-belief, and yields a disjunctive but
negation-incomplete explicit reﬁnement of S4-provability.
Keywords: agents as proof checkers, constructive Kripke-semantics, disjunctive explicit doxastic and
epistemic logic, epistemic deciders as decisive evidence, interactive and oracle computation, multi-agent
systems, negation as failure, proofs as suﬃcient evidence, proof terms as truth values.
1 Introduction
The subject matter of this paper is classical normal modal logic of non-monotonic
interactive proofs, i.e., a novel modal logic of negation-complete and thus disjunctive
interactive proofs (LDiiP) and an existing modal logic of non-disjunctive and thus
negation-incomplete interactive proofs (LiiP) (cf. [20] and [19]). (We abbreviate
interactivity-related adjectives with lower-case letters.)
Our goal here is to produce LDiiP axiomatically as well as semantically from
LiiP. Note that like in [20,19,17], we still understand interactive proofs as suﬃcient
evidence for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking agents (who are though
 Work partially funded with Grant AFR 894328 from the National Research Fund Luxembourg cofunded
under the Marie-Curie Actions of the European Commission (FP7-COFUND) [18].
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unable to guess), and leave probabilistic and polynomial-time resource bounds for
future work.
1.1 Motivation
Our immediate motivation for LDiiP is ﬁrst the theoretical concept and second
the practical application of a negation-complete variant of our interactive proofs
[20,19,17]. The overarching motivation for LDiiP is to serve in an intuitionistic
foundation of interactive computation. See [17] for a programmatic motivation.
1.1.1 Theoretical concept
Like in the non-interactive setting of a single prover-veriﬁer agent, the motivation
for negation-complete (maximal) and consistent logical theories (or ultraﬁlters [6])
and their external and internalised notions of proof is to gain cognitive, constructive,
and computational content.
Recall that a logical theory T is negation-complete by deﬁnition if and only if
(written “:iﬀ” hereafter) for all formulas φ in the language (say L) of T, φ ∈ T or
¬φ ∈ T, and that T is consistent :iﬀ ⊥ ∈ T (so T = L), where ‘¬’ designates nega-
tion (complementation) and ⊥ falsehood (bottom). Notice that each such logical
theory (a ﬁlter 1 of propositions) is deﬁned in terms of a characteristic property and
thus independently of how it is generated (e.g., based on some proof system or sat-
isfaction relation), and that inconsistent theories are trivially negation-complete as
well as classical. Classic examples of non-trivial negation-complete (ﬁrst-order) the-
ories (with equality, but without sets) are: Tarski’s fragment of Euclidean Geometry,
Presburger (natural-number) Arithmetic, and elementary real-number arithmetic.
Given a recursive axiomatisation 2 of and thus an external notion of proof for T,
negation completeness and consistency corresponds to the meta-theorem schema
T φ or T ¬φ (NC) and T ⊥ , respectively. That is, for all φ ∈ L, φ or ¬φ is
a theorem of T, or, model-theoretically speaking, a validity, i.e., a universal truth.
For negation-complete consistent modal theories, this incidentally means that there
is no local truth that is not also a global truth, and thus the point of their modality
(which is non-trivial local truth, i.e., truth in some but not all of their pointed
models) is nulliﬁed. (If T φ then φ is a universal and thus global truth; if T φ
then T ¬φ by the negation completeness of T, and thus ¬φ is a universal and
thus global truth, and hence φ cannot be a local truth by the consistency of T.)
So in some sense, negation-complete modal theories are trivial, even if they are
consistent. Fortunately here, our modal LDiiP is negation-incomplete. It is only
the notion of proof that LDiiP internalises that is negation-complete. Compared
with LDiiP’s internalised agent-centric notion of proof, negation completeness and
consistency corresponds to the axiom schema LDiiP (M a φ) ∨ (M a ¬φ) and
LDiiP ¬(M a⊥), respectively, where M designates a proof (message) and a an
1 A subset in a (logical) lattice is a ﬁlter by deﬁnition if and only if it is closed under meet (conjunction)
and the lattice ordering (implication) [6, Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra].
2 I.e., T has an algorithmically decidable set of axioms. This is a minimal requirement for any practical
logical theory; it guarantees the recognizability of its axioms.
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intended proof-checking agent. Notice how meta-logical negation and disjunction
internalise as their object-logical counterparts. Also, observe that our internalisa-
tion is more concrete than its external counterpart in the sense that the ﬁrst speaks
about a concrete (internalised) proof (suﬃcient evidence) M whereas the latter only
speaks about an abstract (external) provability T. Negation completeness means
that M represents suﬃcient data (e.g., a completion of the local system history
recorded as a log ﬁle) for deciding whether some statement (e.g., about the cur-
rent system state given by the global history) is true or false. Hilbert hoped for
a negation-complete consistent theory for the whole of mathematics, because, in
his word, there is no ignorabimus in negation-complete consistent theories; in some
sense, they are cognitively ideal: All (internalised) proof goals are deﬁnite [23], here
in the sense that their truth or falsehood can be determined unambiguously (and
here even eﬀectively by an agent) by means of (internalised) proofs (thus also called
epistemic deciders). Moreover, negation-complete theories, though necessarily non-
intuitionistic (!), nevertheless enjoy the disjunction property of Intuitionistic Logic
(IL), 3 which is that if IL φ ∨ φ′ then IL φ or IL φ′ (DP) [30]. Thus they have
considerable constructive content, and this even by conserving the deductive conve-
nience of the law of the excluded middle! To see why negation-complete theories are
necessarily classical, suppose that there is a non-classical negation-complete theory
T (i.e., T φ ∨ ¬φ, and T φ or T ¬φ) and derive an immediate contradiction
therefrom by considering the law of right and left ∨-introduction (set φ′ := ¬φ),
which asserts that if T φ or T φ′ then T φ ∨ φ′ (and is also valid in IL). In fact,
for classical logical theories, negation completeness is classically equivalent to the
disjunction property. This is a well-known result, which we recall here.
Theorem 1.1 For classical logical theories (ﬁlters in Boolean algebras or lattices),
negation completeness (maximality or being an ultraﬁlter) is classically equivalent
to the disjunction property (the property of being a prime ﬁlter).
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
Internalising negation-complete proof theories, LDiiP thus internalises their disjunc-
tion property, as the theorem schema LDiiP (M a (φ ∨ φ′)) →
((M a φ)∨ (M a φ′)), which is why we call our internalised proofs also disjunctive.
Yet given ﬁrst, the classicality (and normality) of LDiiP, and second, Theorem 1.1,
which applies to the theories that LDiiP internalises, we could as well have stipu-
lated the internalised disjunction property as axiom schema and then derived the
internalised negation completeness therefrom as theorem schema. That is, in ar-
bitrary classical normal modal logics, we can make the following deduction, where
the universal meta-quantiﬁcation over φ and φ′ in Line 1 is left implicit:
(i)  (φ ∨ φ′) → (φ ∨φ′) assumed internalised disjunction property
(ii)  (φ ∨ ¬φ) → (φ ∨¬φ) 1, particularisation (set φ′ := ¬φ)
(iii)  φ ∨ ¬φ classical tautology
3 See [5] for a survey of other, so-called super-intuitionistic or intermediate logics strictly below classical
propositional logic that also enjoy the disjunction property.
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(iv)  (φ ∨ ¬φ) 3, necessitation (normality)
(v)  φ ∨¬φ 2, 4, modus ponens. (internalised negation completeness)
To see also the computational content in negation-complete consistent theories with
a recursive axiomatisation as previously claimed, recall from classical recursion the-
ory [22] that such theories are actually also recursive (algorithmically decidable) as
a whole, i.e., not only in their set of axioms: The recursiveness of the axioms of a
theory implies the recursive enumerability of its theorems. So in order to decide
whether or not φ ∈ T for a given φ ∈ L in the language L of such a theory T, start
the enumeration process of the members of T. By the negation completeness of T,
either φ or ¬φ will pop up in the process. If φ pops up then stop, and conclude that
φ ∈ T; if ¬φ pops up then stop, and conclude that φ ∈ T by the consistency of T.
In summary, the cognitive, constructive, and computational content of recur-
sively axiomatised negation-complete consistent theories is distilled in their max-
imal consistency, disjunction property, and algorithmic decidability, respectively.
However, their scope is far from the one of Hilbert’s hope: Go¨del ascertained the
negation-incompleteness of any recursively axiomatised consistent theory contain-
ing the Peano-Arithmetic (PA) part of mathematics [22,10]. 4 Worse, consistent
theories containing PA are also algorithmically undecidable [22]. Notwithstand-
ing, recursively axiomatised negation-complete consistent theories, which are thus
strictly weaker than PA, are crucial for practical applications. (Maximally consis-
tent sets are also crucial for theoretical applications such as the canonical-model
construction for axiomatic completeness proofs, cf. Appendix A.4.2.)
1.1.2 Practical application
Both the external as well as the internalised form of negation completeness have
important practical applications. Important practical applications of the external
form “ φ or  ¬φ ” of negation completeness, which have become classics in
computer science and engineering, are logic databases and programming. There,
the external form “ φ or  ¬φ ” classically corresponds to the principle of negation
as failure “  φ implies  ¬φ ”, i.e., ¬φ can be inferred if every possible proof of φ fails
[4,27]. Another important practical application of a modal-logical variant “  Ka(φ)
implies  ¬Ka(φ) ” of negation as failure is artiﬁcial intelligence [25], where Ka(φ)
reads as “agent a knows that φ (is true).” There, this epistemic variant of negation
as failure produces a non-monotonic logic of knowledge for multi-agent distributed
systems. (This is also the only piece of related work that we are aware of.) An
important practical application of our internalised form LDiiP (M a φ)∨M a ¬φ
of negation completeness is accountability for dependable multi-agent distributed
systems (e.g., electronic voting systems [16], and, more generally, the whole Internet
[21]). A multi-agent distributed system S is accountable by deﬁnition if and only if
S is abuse-free and auditable [15]: For all agents b in S, (abuse-freeness), whenever
b behaves correctly (as an agent in S), b can prove to all agents a (including to
4 Although the natural numbers form a strict subset of the real numbers, the negation-incomplete PA
cannot be a subset of the negation-complete elementary real-number arithmetic (R) mentioned earlier; the
natural numbers are not deﬁnable in the language of R [11].
S. Kramer / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2014) 47–7050
herself) in S that she does so, and, (auditability), whenever b behaves incorrectly
(and thus is faulty), every or at least one other agent c in S will eventually be able
to prove to all agents a in S (including to herself and b) that b is faulty, (cf. [15] for
a formal transcription of this natural-language formulation). In such a system S,
each agent b’s behaviour in terms of her past actions can be recorded in a log ﬁle [3]
(say M) that is broadcast; and it is this log ﬁle M that must be constructed so as
to have suﬃcient evidential strength to constitute a negation-complete proof with
respect to the proof goal of b behaving correctly (expressed with an atomic formula
correct(b)):
(M a correct(b)) ∨M a ¬ correct(b)
In other words, M must constitute decisive evidence or, in yet other words, be an
epistemic decider to a about the (ephemeral) issue of b’s correctness. (b can change
her behaviour!) That is, LDiiP is a formal theory of epistemic deciders. For abuse-
freeness (auditability), the prover b (c) must (eventually) know such an M , written
b kM (c kM). We will present formal deﬁnitions in Section 2 and a full formal case
study in future work (cf. [15] for a preliminary, non-axiomatic accountability case
study). Finally, note that a piece of decisive evidence M for correct(b) brought to
the attention of a judge a can be viewed as a kind of forensic trace, since M allows
a to decide whether or not b is correct and thus to decide whether or not b is guilty
of behaving incorrectly.
1.2 Contribution
Conceptual contributions
Our conceptual contributions in this paper are the following. First, we produce
a novel modal logic of negation-complete and thus disjunctive interactive proofs (cf.
Theorem 2.17), which internalises agent-centric negation-complete consistent proof
theories (enjoying the disjunction property) and has important theoretical and prac-
tical applications. Second, we oﬀer the insights that the price to pay for negation
completeness and disjunctiveness is the non-monotonicity and non-communality of
the resulting agent-centric notion of proof (cf. Fact 2.5 and 2.14, respectively), which
turns out to be also a negation-complete disjunctive explicit reﬁnement of standard
KD45-belief (cf. Corollary 2.9). Third, we contribute a disjunctive but negation-
incomplete explicit reﬁnement of S4-provability (cf. Corollary 2.10), constructed
from our notion of proof.
Technical contributions
Our technical contributions are the following. First, we provide a standard
but also oracle-computational and set-theoretically constructive Kripke-semantics
for LDiiP (cf. Section 2.2). Like in [20,19], we endow the proof modality with a
standard Kripke-semantics [1], but whose accessibility relation MRa we ﬁrst deﬁne
constructively in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions, 5 namely as MRa,
5 in loose analogy with the set-theoretically constructive rather than the purely axiomatic deﬁnition of num-
bers [7] of ordered pairs (e.g., the now standard deﬁnition by Kuratowski, and other well-known deﬁnitions
[23])
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and then match to an abstract semantic interface in standard form (which abstractly
stipulates the characteristic properties of the accessibility relation [9]). We will say
that MRa exempliﬁes (or realises) MRa. (A simple example of a set-theoretically
constructive but non-intuitionistic deﬁnition of a modal accessibility is the well-
known deﬁnition of epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability deﬁned in
terms of equality of state projections [8].) The Kripke-semantics for LDiiP is oracle-
computational in the sense that (cf. Deﬁnition 2.11) the individual proof knowledge
(say M) can be thought of as being provided by an imaginary computation oracle,
which thus acts as a hypothetical provider and imaginary epistemic source of our
interactive proofs. Second, we prove Theorem 2.8, which establishes the proof-
terms-as-truth-values view as well as a normal form for the special case of a singleton
agent universe. Third, we prove the ﬁnite-model property (cf. Theorem 2.18) and
the algorithmic decidability of LDiiP (cf. Corollary 2.19). (Negation completeness
implies algorithmic decidability as seen in Section 1.1.1, but not vice versa as LDiiP
testiﬁes.)
1.3 Roadmap
In the next section, we introduce our Logic of Disjunctive instant interactive Proofs
(LDiiP) axiomatically by means of a compact closure operator that induces the
Hilbert-style proof system that we seek. We then gain the (syntactic) insight that
negation completeness implies non-monotonicity (cf. Fact 2.5), and prove the above-
mentioned Theorem 2.8 as well as Corollary 2.9 and 2.10 within the obtained system.
Next, we introduce the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard
abstract semantic interface for LDiiP (cf. Section 2.2), and prove the axiomatic
adequacy of the proof system with respect to this interface (cf. Theorem 2.17).
We justify the existence of the constructive semantics of LDiiP by invoking the
Axiom of Choice on LiiP’s (cf. Table 1) and then also construct it in terms of a
concrete oracle-computable function, from which we gain the (semantic) insight
that negation completeness implies non-communality (cf. Fact 2.14). Last but not
least, we prove the ﬁnite-model property (cf. Theorem 2.18) and, therefrom, the
algorithmic decidability (cf. Corollary 2.19) of LDiiP.
2 LDiiP
2.1 Syntactically
Like the Logic of instant interactive Proofs (LiiP), the Logic of Disjunctive in-
stant interactive Proofs (LDiiP) provides a modal formula language over a generic
message term language. The formula language of LDiiP oﬀers the propositional
constructors, a relational symbol ‘ k ’ for constructing atomic propositions about
individual knowledge (e.g., a kM), and a modal constructor ‘a ’ for propositions
about proofs (e.g., M a φ). In brief, LDiiP is a minimal extension of classical
propositional logic with an interactively generalised additional operator (the proof
modality) and proof-term language. Note, the language of LDiiP is identical to
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the one of LiiP [20,19] modulo the proof-modality notation, which in LiiP is ‘ ::Ca ’,
where a acts as proof checker, like in LDiiP, and C as a’s peer group, unlike in LDiiP
(non-communality).
Deﬁnition 2.1 [The language of LDiiP] Let
• A = ∅ designate a non-empty ﬁnite set of agent names a, b, c, etc.
• M designate a language of message terms M such that a ∈ M
• P designate a denumerable set of propositional variables P constrained such that
for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M, (a kM) ∈ P (for “a knows M”) is a distinguished
variable, i.e., an atomic proposition, (for individual knowledge)
(So, for a ∈ A, a k · is a unary relational symbol.)
• L 	 φ ::= P ∣∣ ¬φ ∣∣ φ ∧ φ ∣∣ M a φ designate our language of logical formulas
φ, where M a φ reads “M can disjunctively prove that φ to a” in the sense that
“M can prove whether or not φ (is true) to a.”
Note the following macro-deﬁnitions:  := aa a k a, ⊥ := ¬, φ ∨ φ′ := ¬(¬φ ∧
¬φ′), φ → φ′ := ¬φ ∨ φ′, and φ ↔ φ′ := (φ → φ′) ∧ (φ′ → φ).
Then, LDiiP has the following axiom and deduction-rule schemas, where grey-
shading indicates the remaining essential diﬀerences to LiiP (cf. [20] and [19]).
Deﬁnition 2.2 [The axioms and deduction rules of LDiiP] Let
• Γ0 designate an adequate set of axioms for classical propositional logic
• Γ1 designate some appropriate set of axioms for a kM
• Γ2 := Γ0 ∪ Γ1 ∪ {
· M a a kM (self-knowledge)
· (M a (φ → φ′)) → ((M a φ) → M a φ′) (Kripke’s law, K)
· (M a φ) → (a kM → φ) (epistemic truthfulness)
· ¬(M a⊥) (proof consistency)
· (M a φ) ∨M a ¬φ (negation completeness) }
designate the axiom schemas of LDiiP.
Then, LDiiP := Cl(∅) := ⋃n∈NCln(∅), where for all Γ ⊆ L:
Cl0(Γ) := Γ2 ∪ Γ
Cln+1(Γ) :=Cln(Γ) ∪
{ φ′ | {φ, φ → φ′} ⊆ Cln(Γ) } ∪ (modus ponens, MP)
{ M a φ | φ ∈ Cln(Γ) } ∪ (necessitation, N).
We call LDiiP a base theory, and Cl(Γ) an LDiiP-theory for any Γ ⊆ L.
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Notice the logical order of LDiiP, which like LiiP’s is, due to propositions about
(proofs of) propositions, higher-order propositional. From LiiP (cf. [20] and [19]),
we recall the discussions of Kripke’s law (K), the law of epistemic truthfulness, and
the law of necessitation (N): The key to the validity of K is that we understand inter-
active proofs as suﬃcient evidence for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking
agents (who are though still unable to guess). Clearly for such agents, if M is suf-
ﬁcient evidence for φ → φ′ and φ then so is M for φ′. Then, the signiﬁcance of
epistemic truthfulness to interactivity is that in truly distributed multi-agent sys-
tems, not all proofs are known by all agents, i.e., agents are not omniscient with
respect to messages. Otherwise, why communicate with each other? So there being
a proof does not imply knowledge of that proof. When an agent a does not know
the proof and the agent cannot generate the proof ex nihilo herself by guessing
it, only communication from a peer, who thus acts as an oracle, can entail the
knowledge of the proof with a. Next, the justiﬁcation for N is that in interactive
settings, validities, and thus a fortiori tautologies (in the strict sense of validities
of the propositional fragment), are in some sense trivialities [17]. To see why, recall
that modal validities are true in all pointed models (cf. Deﬁnition A.1), and thus
not worth being communicated from one point to another in a given model, e.g., by
means of speciﬁc interactive proofs. (Nothing is logically more embarrassing than
talking in tautologies.) Therefore, validities deserve arbitrary proofs. What is worth
being communicated are truths weaker than validities, namely local truths in the
standard model-theoretic sense (cf. Deﬁnition A.1), which may not hold universally.
Otherwise why communicate with each other? We continue to discuss the remain-
ing, new axioms and rules. As mentioned, the message language M of LDiiP is
generic, and thus a kM will require axioms that are appropriate to the term struc-
ture of the chosen M ∈ M (such as those required for LiiP [20,19]). The validity of
the axiom schema of self-knowledge is justiﬁed by oracle computation: “if a were
to receive M , e.g., from an oracle, then a would know M” (cf. Deﬁnition 2.11).
(The law of self-knowledge is also valid in LiiP, where it corresponds to the theo-
rem [but not axiom] schema M ::∅a a kM .) The axiom schema of proof consistency
and negation completeness internalises (external theory) consistency and negation
completeness, respectively (cf. Section 1.1.1). Observe that internalised negation
completeness is deﬁned independently of the proof-term structure (M is abstract),
just as (external) negation completeness of a logical theory is deﬁned independently
of its possible proof-system structure. However, this abstract deﬁnition is an in-
direct, structural constraint: after all, not any proof-system structure generates a
negation-complete theory.
Proposition 2.3 (Hilbert-style proof system) Let
• Φ LDiiP φ :iﬀ if Φ ⊆ LDiiP then φ ∈ LDiiP
• φ LDiiP φ′ :iﬀ {φ} LDiiP φ′ and {φ′} LDiiP φ
• LDiiP φ :iﬀ ∅ LDiiP φ.
In other words, LDiiP ⊆ 2L × L is a system of closure conditions in the sense of
[28, Deﬁnition 3.7.4]. For example:
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(i) for all axioms φ ∈ Γ2, LDiiP φ
(ii) for modus ponens, {φ, φ → φ′} LDiiP φ′
(iii) for necessitation, {φ} LDiiP M a φ.
(In the space-saving, horizontal Hilbert-notation “Φ LDiiP φ”, Φ is not a set of
hypotheses but a set of premises, cf. modus ponens and necessitation.) Then LDiiP
can be viewed as being deﬁned by a Cl-induced Hilbert-style proof system. In fact
Cl : 2L → 2L is a standard consequence operator, i.e., a substitution-invariant
compact closure operator.
Proof. Like in [17]. That a Hilbert-style proof system can be viewed as induced
by a compact closure operator is well-known (e.g., see [12]); that Cl is indeed such
an operator can be veriﬁed by inspection of the inductive deﬁnition of Cl; and
substitution invariance follows from our deﬁnitional use of axiom schemas. 6 
Corollary 2.4 (Normality) LDiiP is a normal modal logic.
Proof. Jointly by Kripke’s law, modus ponens, necessitation (these by deﬁnition),
and substitution invariance (cf. Proposition 2.3). 
Note that in LDiiP, an analog of the primitive LiiP-rule
{a kM ↔ a kM ′} LiiP (M ′ ::Ca φ) ↔ M ::Ca φ (see [20,19])
would be invalid (because incompatible with negation completeness) and thus is not
admitted in LDiiP. A fortiori, an analog of the stronger primitive LiP-rule
{a kM → a kM ′} LiP (M ′ :Ca φ) → M :Ca φ (see [20,17])
by which proof monotonicity LiP (M :Ca φ) → (M,M ′) :Ca φ under paired data M ′
can be deduced, would be invalid and thus is not admitted in LDiiP either. We
thus assert the following negative fact about our negation-complete proofs.
Fact 2.5 Negation completeness implies non-monotonicity.
Note that if we introduced a pairing constructor for proof terms into the message
language M of LDiiP (as with LiiP, cf. Table 1), Fact 2.5 would mean that
LDiiP (M a φ) → (M,M ′)a φ .
Fact 2.6
(i) {φ → φ′} LDiiP (M a φ) → M a φ′ (regularity)
(ii) LDiiP ¬(M a⊥) ↔ ((M a φ) → ¬(M a ¬φ))
(iii) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ M a (φ → ⊥)
6 Alternatively to axiom schemas, we could have used axioms together with an additional substitution-rule
set { σ[φ] | φ ∈ Cln(Γ) } in the deﬁniens of Cln+1(Γ).
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Proof. 1 and 2 are well-known for necessity modalities in arbitrary normal modal
logics. For 3, consider that LDiiP ¬φ ↔ (φ → ⊥) since ¬φ ↔ (φ → ⊥) is a classical
tautology, and then deduce the conclusion by 1. 
Lemma 2.7
(i) LDiiP M a ((M a φ) → φ) (self-proof of truthfulness)
(ii) LDiiP (M a (M a φ)) → M a φ (proof density)
Proof. See Appendix A.2 
The laws of self-proof of truthfulness and proof density also hold in LiiP [20,19].
We continue to present the ﬁrst important result about LDiiP.
Theorem 2.8 (Proof terms as Truth values)
(i) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ ¬(M a φ) (maximal consistency)
(ii) LDiiP (M a (φ ∧ φ′)) ↔ ((M a φ) ∧M a φ′) (proof conjunctions bis)
(iii) LDiiP (M a (φ ∨ φ′)) ↔ ((M a φ) ∨M a φ′) (IDP bis)
(iv) LDiiP (M a (φ → φ′)) ↔ ((M a φ) → M a φ′) (K bis)
(v) LDiiP (M a (φ ↔ φ′)) ↔ ((M a φ) ↔ M a φ′) (Bi-K)
(vi) LDiiP (M a (M a φ)) ↔ M a φ (modal idempotency)
(vii) LDiiP b kM → ((M b (M a φ)) ↔ M a φ) (modal idempotency bis)
Proof. See Appendix A.3 
“IDP” abbreviates “Internalised Disjunction Property.” The laws are enumerated
in a (total) order that respects their respective proof prerequisites. Notice that The-
orem 2.8.2–2.8.5 are modal distributivity laws. They assert that the proof modality
of LDiiP is fully distributive over (binary) Boolean operators. While the laws of
proof conjunction bis and modal idempotency also hold in LiiP [20,19], only the
if-direction of the laws IDP bis and K bis hold in LiiP. Notice also that modal
idempotency combines proof density (cf. Lemma 2.7.2) and proof transitivity (cf.
Line l of the proof of modal idempotency). Like in LiiP and LiP, the key to the
validity of modal idempotency is that each agent (e.g., a) can act herself as proof
checker, see [17, Section 3.2.2] for more details. The law of modal idempotency bis
is a generalisation of modal idempotency. Observe that when |A| = 1, Theorem 2.8
implies that all occurrences of the proof modality in a compound LDiiP-formula
can be compiled away in the sense that all these occurrences can be pushed in front
of possibly negated atomic sub-formulas (i.e., literals) of the compound formula,
with the axiom formula M a a kM acting as base case. Hence in this case, we
can understand proof terms as truth-values in the spirit of a form of realizability
interpretation of constructive logic [29, Section 7.8]. Otherwise, i.e., when |A| > 1
(recall from Deﬁnition 2.1 that A = ∅), it is possible that not all such occurrences
in a compound formula can be compiled away (cf. Theorem 2.8.7).
The following corollary asserts that our negation-complete and thus disjunc-
tive proof modality is also an explicit reﬁnement of the standard (implicit) belief
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modality [24].
Corollary 2.9 (Negation-complete Disjunctive Explicit Belief)
‘M a ·’ is a negation-complete disjunctive KD45-modality of explicit agent belief,
where M represents the explicit evidence term that can justify agent a’s belief.
Proof. Consider that ‘M a ·’ satisﬁes Kripke’s law (K, cf. Deﬁnition 2.2), the D-
law (called “proof consistency” in Deﬁnition 2.2), the 4-law (cf. the only-if part of
Theorem 2.8.6), necessitation (cf. Deﬁnition 2.2), and negation completeness (cf.
Deﬁnition 2.2), and thus the internalised disjunction property (cf. the if-part of
Theorem 2.8.3). That ‘M a ·’ also satisﬁes the 5-law can be proved as follows:
(i) LDiiP ¬(M a φ) → (M a ¬φ) only-if-part of Theorem 2.8.1
(ii) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) → M a (M a ¬φ) only-if-part of Theorem 2.8.6[¬φ]
(iii) LDiiP ¬(M a φ) → M a (M a ¬φ) 1, 2, transitivity of →
(iv) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) → ¬(M a φ) if-part of Theorem 2.8.1
(v) LDiiP (M a (M a ¬φ)) → M a ¬(M a φ) 4, regularity
(vi) LDiiP ¬(M a φ) → M a ¬(M a φ) 3, 5, transitivity of →.

Thanks to epistemic truthfulness, a kM is a suﬃcient condition for ‘M a ·’ to
behave like a standard S5-knowledge modality [24,8,14], which not only obeys the
D-law but also the stronger T-law, in the sense that
LDiiP a kM → ((M a φ) → φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
T-law
).
In the following corollary, we construct also a disjunctive but negation-incomplete
explicit reﬁnement of (implicit) S4-provability.
Corollary 2.10 (Disjunctive Explicit Provability) ‘a kM ∧ M a ·’ is a dis-
junctive but negation-incomplete S4-modality of explicit agent provability, where
M represents the explicit evidence term that does justify agent a’s knowledge.
Proof. By Corollary 2.9 and the fact that the truth law LDiiP (a kM∧M a φ) → φ
for the modality ‘a kM ∧M a ·’ is equivalent to the law of epistemic truthfulness
(cf. Deﬁnition 2.2). Note that although the modality ‘a kM ∧M a ·’ is evidently
disjunctive, i.e., LDiiP (a kM ∧ M a (φ ∨ φ′)) → ((a kM ∧ M a φ) ∨ (a kM ∧
M a φ′)), it is negation-incomplete in that LDiiP (a kM ∧ M a φ) ∨ (a kM ∧
M a ¬φ), because LDiiP a kM , in turn because of the arbitrariness of Γ1 (cf.
Deﬁnition 2.2). Fixing Γ1 so that a resource-unbounded agent a unable to guess
knows all messages M could only make sense for A = {a}. Otherwise, i.e., when all
agents know all messages, why interact with each other? 
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2.2 Semantically
We continue to present the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard
abstract semantic interface for LDiiP, and prove the axiomatic adequacy of the proof
system with respect to this interface. We justify the existence of the constructive
semantics of LDiiP by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP’s [20,19] and then also
construct it in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function.
2.2.1 Concretely
The ingredients for the concrete semantics of LiiP, from which we will construct the
concrete semantics of LDiiP, are displayed in Table 1. Therefrom, we will only need
a concrete instance of S and msgsa, and an abstract instance of clsa as ingredients for
LDiiP. Observe there that the concrete accessibility MR
C
a of LiiP is a totally deﬁned
proper (non-functional) relation. Yet we do need a concrete accessibility relation for
LDiiP that is functional, because LDiiP’s negation-completeness axiom corresponds
to the functionality property of such a relation. (LDiiP’s proof consistency axiom
corresponds to the totality property of such a relation.) Fortunately, the concrete
accessibility MR
C
a of LiiP is totally deﬁned, and so we know by the Axiom of Choice
AC[MR
C
a ], which we may thus apply to MR
C
a , that MR
C
a can be “functionalised,” that
is [23],
for all s ∈ S, there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRCa s′︸ ︷︷ ︸
MR
C
a is totally deﬁned
implies
there is f : S → S such that for all s ∈ S, s MRCa f(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MR
C
a can be “functionalised”
. (AC[MR
C
a ])
Notice that the Axiom of Choice is non-constructive in that it abstractly asserts
the conditional existence of a certain f but without actually providing a concrete
example of such an f . Thus our problem now is to ﬁnd such an f for MR
C
a , which will
allow us to construct a functional concrete accessibility for LDiiP. In Deﬁnition 2.11,
we construct such an f as an oracle-computational function σMa on concrete states
constructed inductively in terms of certain generalised successor functions. The
essential diﬀerences in Deﬁnition 2.11 to Table 1 are grey-shaded.
Deﬁnition 2.11 [Semantic ingredients] For the set-theoretically constructive, model-
theoretic study of LDiiP let
• S 	 s ::= 0 ∣∣ succMa (s) , where 0 can be understood as a zero data point (repre-
senting an initial state for example), and succMa can be read as “agent a receives
message M (for example from another agent acting as an oracle)”
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Let
• S  s designate the state space—a set of system states s
• msgsa : S → 2M designate a raw-data extractor that extracts (without analysing) the (ﬁnite) set
of messages from a system state s that agent a ∈ A has either generated (assuming that only a can
generate a’s signature) or else received as such (not only as a strict subterm of another message);
that is, msgsa(s) is a’s data base in s
• clsa : 2M → 2M designate a data-mining operator such that clsa(D) := cla(msgsa(s) ∪ D) :=⋃
n∈N cl
n
a (msgsa(s) ∪ D), where for all D ⊆ M:
cl0a(D) := {a} ∪ D
cln+1a (D) := clna (D) ∪
{ (M,M ′) | {M,M ′} ⊆ clna (D) } ∪ (pairing)
{ M,M ′ | (M,M ′) ∈ clna (D) } ∪ (unpairing)
{ {[M ]}a | M ∈ clna (D) } ∪ (personal signature synthesis)
{ (M, b) | {[M ]}b ∈ clna (D) } (universal signature analysis)
• <Ma ⊆ S × S designate a data preorder on states such that for all s, s′ ∈ S, s <Ma s′ :iﬀ
clsa({M}) = cls
′
a (∅), were M can be viewed as oracle input in addition to a’s individual-
knowledge base clsa(∅) (cf. also [17, Section 2.2])
• <MC := (
⋃
a∈C <
M
a )
++, where ‘++’ designates the closure operation of so-called generalised
transitivity in the sense that <MC ◦<M
′
C ⊆ <
(M,M′)
C
• ≡a := <aa designate an equivalence relation of state indistinguishability
• MRCa ⊆ S × S designate a concretely constructed accessibility relation—short, concrete accessibil-
ity—for the non-monotonic proof modality of LiiP such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s MR
C
a s
′ :iﬀ s′ ∈
⋃
s <MC∪{a} s˜ and
M ∈ cls˜a(∅)
[s˜]≡a
(iﬀ there is s˜ ∈ S s.t. s <MC∪{a} s˜ and M ∈ cls˜a(∅) and s˜ ≡a s′).
Table 1
Semantic ingredients for LiiP [20,19] (partially reused here for LDiiP)
• msgsa : S → 2M be such that
msgsa(0) := ∅
msgsa(succ
M
b (s)) :=
{
msgsa(s) ∪ {M} if a = b, and
msgsa(s) otherwise
• cla : 2M → 2M designate a compact closure operator and deﬁne clsa : 2M → 2M
such that clsa(D) := cla(msgsa(s) ∪ D) :=
⋃
n∈N cl
n
a(msgsa(s) ∪ D)
• σMa : S → S be so that σMa (s) :=
{
s if M ∈ clsa(∅), and
succMa (s) otherwise (oracle input)
• MRa ⊆ S × S designate a concretely constructed accessibility relation—short,
concrete accessibility—for the negation-complete disjunctive proof modality such
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that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s MRa s
′ :iﬀ s′ = σMa (s).
Fact 2.12
(i) σMa (and thus MRa) is oracle-computable.
(ii) If cla is polynomial-time computable then so is σ
M
a (and thus MRa).
Proof. Clearly, if cla is computable then σ
M
a is computable, and similarly for 2.
In particular when cla = id2M , that is, when cla is the identity function on 2
M (a
performs no data-mining operations), MRa is polynomial-time computable.
Fact 2.13 For σMa , ﬁx cla as in Table 1. Then:
(i) for all s ∈ S, s MRCa σMa (s) ;
(ii) MRa ⊆ MR∅a (and MR∅a ⊆ MRCa [20,19]).
Proof. Fix cla as in Table 1. For 1, consider that s <
M
a σ
M
a (s) and thus s <
M
C∪{a}
σMa (s), M ∈ clσ
M
a (s)
a (∅), and σMa (s) ≡a σMa (s) in Table 1. Hence there is s˜ ∈ S such
that s <MC∪{a} s˜ and M ∈ cls˜a(∅) and s˜ ≡a σMa (s). (In reverse, σMa can be used as a
Skolem-function for the existential quantiﬁer in the previous statement and thus in
the deﬁniens of MR
C
a in Table 1.) For 2, inspect 1 and deﬁnitions. 
Hence we have indeed found in σMa an instance of an f for MR
C
a whose existence
AC[MR
C
a ] postulates and thus indeed constructed a functional totally deﬁned sub-
relation MRa of MR
C
a—from MR
C
a itself (as a Skolemnisation of its deﬁniens). How-
ever notice that we have lost C in MRa (non-communality), because σMa simply
disregards C. This is the price for the functionality of MRa. Actually, MRa (for
LDiiP) is a functional analog of <Ma (for LiiP, see Table 1). And it is impossible
to construct a functional analog of MR
C
a from a union of MRa over C, because such
a union of functions need not be a function anymore. In contrast, it is possible
to construct a functional analog of MR
C
a from an intersection of MRa over C, since
such an intersection of functions is again a function. Yet unfortunately it then need
not be total anymore! We can thus assert the following negative fact about our
negation-complete proofs.
Fact 2.14 Negation-completeness implies non-communality.
This fact could be useful to establish the theoretical and thus also practical impos-
sibility of engineering social procedures [26] for which negation completeness would
be a necessary condition. Due to the same fact, there is no community parameter
C in ‘a ’ and, in particular, no LDiiP-analog of the LiiP-axiom
LiiP (M ::C∪C′a φ) → M ::Ca φ (see [20,19]).
Note that if we were to mix LiiP- and LDiiP-modalities in a single logic, the formula
(M ::∅a φ) → M a φ would be a sound axiom in that logic due to Fact 2.13.2.
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Table 2
Satisfaction relation
(S,V), s |= P :iﬀ s ∈ V(P )
(S,V), s |= ¬φ :iﬀ not (S,V), s |= φ
(S,V), s |= φ ∧ φ′ :iﬀ (S,V), s |= φ and (S,V), s |= φ′
(S,V), s |= M a φ :iﬀ for all s′ ∈ S, if s MRa s′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ
Proposition 2.15
(i) there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRa s′ (seriality/totality)
(ii) if s MRa s
′ and s MRa s′′ then s′ = s′′ (determinism/functionality)
(iii) if M ∈ clsa(∅) then s MRa s (conditional reﬂexivity)
(iv) if s MRa s
′ then M ∈ cls′a (∅) (epistemic image)
Proof. By inspection of deﬁnitions. (For 4, consider that M ∈ clsuccMa (s)a (∅).) 
2.2.2 Abstractly
We now continue to present the abstract semantic interface for LDiiP, and prove
the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to this interface.
Deﬁnition 2.16 [Kripke-model] We deﬁne the satisfaction relation ‘ |=’ for LDiiP
in Table 2, where
• V : P → 2S designates a usual valuation function, yet partially predeﬁned such
that for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M,
V(a kM) := { s ∈ S | M ∈ clsa(∅) }
for S assumed abstract (and thus general) like in Table 1 and clsa like in Deﬁni-
tion 2.11 but with msgsa abstract (and thus general) like in Table 1
• S := (S, {MRa}M∈M,a∈A) designates a (modal) frame for LDiiP with an ab-
stractly constrained accessibility relation—short, abstract accessibility—MRa ⊆
S × S for the negation-complete disjunctive proof modality such that—the se-
mantic interface:
· there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRa s′ (seriality/totality)
· if s MRa s′ and s MRa s′′ then s′ = s′′ (determinism/functionality)
· if M ∈ clsa(∅) then s MRa s (conditional reﬂexivity)
· if s MRa s′ then M ∈ cls
′
a (∅) (epistemic image)
• (S,V) designates a (modal) model for LDiiP.
Looking back, we recognise that Proposition 2.15 actually establishes the im-
portant fact that our concrete accessibility MRa in Deﬁnition 2.11 realises all the
properties stipulated by our abstract accessibility MRa in Deﬁnition 2.16; we say
S. Kramer / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2014) 47–70 61
that
MRa exempliﬁes (or realises) MRa.
Theorem 2.17 (Axiomatic adequacy) LDiiP is adequate for |=, i.e.,:
(i) if LDiiP φ then |= φ (axiomatic soundness)
(ii) if |= φ then LDiiP φ (semantic completeness).
Proof. Both parts can be proved with standard means: soundness follows as usual
from the admissibility of the axioms and rules (cf. Appendix A.4.1); and com-
pleteness follows by means of the classical construction of canonical models, using
Lindenbaum’s construction of maximally consistent sets (cf. Appendix A.4.2). 
Theorem 2.18 (Finite-model property) For any LDiiP-model M, if M,
s |= φ then there is a ﬁnite LDiiP-model Mﬁn such that Mﬁn, s |= φ.
Proof. By the fact that the minimal ﬁltration [13]
Mmin,Γﬂt := (S/∼Γ , {MRmin,Γa }M∈M,a∈A,VΓ)
of any LDiiP-model M := (S, {MRa}M∈M,a∈A,V) through a ﬁnite Γ ⊆ L is a ﬁnite
LDiiP-model such that for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ if and only if Mmin,Γﬂt , [s]∼Γ |= γ.
Following [13] for our setting, we deﬁne
∼Γ := { (s, s′) ∈ S × S | for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ iﬀ M, s′ |= γ }
MRmin,Γa := { ([s]∼Γ , [s′]∼Γ) | (s, s′) ∈ MRa }
VΓ(P ) := { [s]∼Γ | s ∈ V(P ) } .
We further ﬁx M ∈ cl[s]∼Γa (∅) :iﬀ [s]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(a kM), and choose Γ to be the (ﬁnite)
sub-formula closure of φ. Hence, we are left to prove thatMmin,Γﬂt is indeed an LDiiP-
model, which means that we are left to prove that MRmin,Γa has all the properties
stipulated by the semantic interface of LDiiP:
• MRmin,Γa inherits seriality/totality as well as determinism/functionality from MRa,
as can be seen by inspecting the deﬁnition of MRmin,Γa ;
• for conditional reﬂexivity, suppose that M ∈ cl[s]∼Γa (∅). Thus consecutively:
[s]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(a kM) by deﬁnition, s ∈ V(a kM) by deﬁnition, M ∈ clsa(∅) by deﬁ-
nition, s MRa s by the conditional reﬂexivity of MRa, and ﬁnally [s]∼Γ MRmin,Γa
[s]∼Γ by deﬁnition;
• for the epistemic-image property, suppose that [s]∼Γ MRmin,Γa [s′]∼Γ . Thus con-
secutively: s MRa s′ by deﬁnition, M ∈ cls
′
a (∅) by the epistemic-image property
of MRa, s′ ∈ V(a kM) by deﬁnition, [s′]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(a kM) by deﬁnition, and ﬁnally
M ∈ cl[s
′]∼Γ
a (∅) by deﬁnition.

Corollary 2.19 (Algorithmic decidability) If the sub-theory generated by Γ1
(cf. Deﬁnition 2.2) is algorithmically decidable then LDiiP (over Γ1) is so too.
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Proof. In order to algorithmically decide whether or not φ ∈ LDiiP (that is, LDiiP
φ), axiomatic adequacy allows us to check whether or not ¬φ is locally satisﬁable
(that is, whether or not M, s |= ¬φ for some LDiiP-model M and state s; by
assumption, M ∈ clsa(∅), modelling membership in the theory generated by Γ1, is
decidable.). But then, the ﬁnite-model property of LDiiP allows us to enumerate
all ﬁnite LDiiP-models Mﬁn up to a size of at most 2 to the power of the size n of
the sub-formula closure of ¬φ and to check whether or not Mﬁn, s |= ¬φ. (There
are at most 2n equivalence classes for n formulas.) 
So in some sense, we have proved the algorithmic decidability of the epistemic
decisiveness of the evidence terms in LDiiP. Note that the algorithmic complexity
of LDiiP will depend on the speciﬁc choice of Γ1 in Deﬁnition 2.2.
3 Conclusion
We have produced LDiiP from LiiP with as main contributions those described in
Section 1.2. In future work, we shall work out dynamic and ﬁrst-order extensions
of LDiiP as well as the preliminary case study [15] mentioned in Section 1.1.2.
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A Remaining proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Suppose that T is a classical logical theory with language L (i.e., for all φ ∈ L,
T φ ∨ ¬φ).
• For the if-direction, suppose that for all φ ∈ L, T φ or T ¬φ, and let φ, φ′ ∈ L.
Thus T φ or T ¬φ. Let us proceed by case analysis of this disjunction:
· So ﬁrst suppose that T φ. Hence T φ or T φ′ (from A infer A or B), and thus
T φ∨φ′ (vacously) implies T φ or T φ′ (from A or B infer C implies A or B).
· Now suppose that T ¬φ. Further suppose that T φ ∨ φ′ (that is, C). Hence
T φ′ (that is, B), and thus T φ or T φ′ (from B infer A or B). (Thus inferring
C implies A or B.)
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• For the only-if direction, suppose that for all φ, φ′ ∈ L, T φ∨ φ′ implies T φ or
T φ′, and let φ ∈ L. Hence T φ∨¬φ implies T φ or T ¬φ (particularising the
universally quantiﬁed φ′ with ¬φ). Hence T φ or T ¬φ, since we have initially
supposed T to be classical.
(See also [6].)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.7
(i) (a) LDiiP (M a φ) → (a kM → φ) epistemic truthfulness
(b) LDiiP a kM → ((M a φ) → φ) a, PL
(c) LDiiP (M a (a kM)) → M a ((M a φ) → φ) b, regularity
(d) LDiiP M a a kM self-knowledge
(e) LDiiP M a ((M a φ) → φ) c, d, PL.
(ii) (a) LDiiP M a ((M a φ) → φ) Lemma 2.7.1
(b) LDiiP (M a ((M a φ) → φ)) → ((M a (M a φ)) → M a φ) K
(c) LDiiP (M a (M a φ)) → M a φ a, b, PL.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.8
(i) (a) LDiiP ¬(M a⊥) proof consistency
(b) LDiiP ¬(M a⊥) ↔ ((M a φ) → ¬(M a ¬φ)) Fact 2.6
(c) LDiiP (M a φ) → ¬(M a ¬φ) a, b, PL
(d) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) → ¬(M a φ) c, PL
(e) LDiiP (M a φ) ∨M a ¬φ negation completeness
(f) LDiiP ¬(M a φ) → M a ¬φ e, PL
(g) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ ¬(M a φ) d, f, PL.
(ii) (a) LDiiP φ → (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)) tautology
(b) LDiiP (M a φ) → M a (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)) a, regularity
(c) LDiiP (M a (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′))) → ((M a φ′) → M a (φ ∧ φ′)) K
(d) LDiiP (M a φ) → ((M a φ′) → M a (φ ∧ φ′)) b, c, PL
(e) LDiiP ((M a φ) ∧M a φ′) → M a (φ ∧ φ′) d, PL
(f) LDiiP (φ ∧ φ′) → φ tautology
(g) LDiiP (M a (φ ∧ φ′)) → M a φ f, regularity
(h) LDiiP (φ ∧ φ′) → φ′ tautology
(i) LDiiP (M a (φ ∧ φ′)) → M a φ′ h, regularity
(j) LDiiP (M a (φ ∧ φ′)) → ((M a φ) ∧M a φ′) g, i, PL
(k) LDiiP ((M a φ) ∧M a φ′) ↔ M a (φ ∧ φ′) e, j, PL.
(iii) (a) LDiiP (M a (φ ∨ φ′)) ↔ M a ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′) deﬁnition
(b) LDiiP (M a ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)) ↔ ¬(M a (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)) Theorem 2.8.1
(c) LDiiP (M a (φ ∨ φ′)) ↔ ¬(M a (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)) a, b, PL
(d) LDiiP (M a (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)) ↔ ((M a ¬φ) ∧M a ¬φ′) Theorem 2.8.2
(e) LDiiP ¬(M a (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)) ↔ ¬((M a ¬φ) ∧M a ¬φ′) d, PL
(f) LDiiP (M a (φ ∨ φ′)) ↔ ¬((M a ¬φ) ∧M a ¬φ′) c, e, PL
(g) LDiiP ¬((M a ¬φ) ∧M a ¬φ′) ↔ (¬(M a ¬φ) ∨ ¬(M a ¬φ′)) PL
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(h) LDiiP (M a (φ ∨ φ′)) ↔ (¬(M a ¬φ) ∨ ¬(M a ¬φ′)) f, g, PL
(i) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ ¬(M a φ) Theorem 2.8.1
(j) LDiiP ¬(M a ¬φ) ↔ (M a φ) i, PL
(k) LDiiP (M a ¬φ′) ↔ ¬(M a φ′) Theorem 2.8.1
(l) LDiiP ¬(M a ¬φ′) ↔ (M a φ′) k, PL
(m) LDiiP (M a (φ ∨ φ′)) ↔ ((M a φ) ∨M a φ′) h, j, l, PL.
(iv) (a) LDiiP ((M a φ) → M a φ′) ↔ (¬(M a φ) ∨M a φ′) deﬁnition
(b) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ ¬(M a φ) Theorem 2.8.1
(c) LDiiP ((M a φ) → M a φ′) ↔ ((M a ¬φ) ∨M a φ′) a, b, PL
(d) LDiiP (M a (¬φ ∨ φ′)) ↔ ((M a ¬φ) ∨M a φ′) Theorem 2.8.3
(e) LDiiP ((M a φ) → M a φ′) ↔ M a (¬φ ∨ φ′) c, d, PL
(f) LDiiP ((M a φ) → M a φ′) ↔ M a (φ → φ′) e, deﬁnition.
(v) by Theorem 2.8.2 and 2.8.4.
(vi) (a) LDiiP (M a (M a φ)) → M a φ Lemma 2.7.2
(b) LDiiP (M a (M a ¬φ)) → M a ¬φ Lemma 2.7.2
(c) LDiiP ¬(M a ¬φ) → ¬(M a (M a ¬φ)) b, PL
(d) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ ¬(M a φ) Theorem 2.8.1
(e) LDiiP ¬(M a ¬φ) ↔ (M a φ) d, PL
(f) LDiiP (M a φ) → ¬(M a (M a ¬φ)) c, e, PL
(g) LDiiP (M a (M a ¬φ)) ↔ M a ¬(M a φ) d, regularity
(h) LDiiP ¬(M a (M a ¬φ)) ↔ ¬(M a ¬(M a φ)) g, PL
(i) LDiiP (M a φ) → ¬(M a ¬(M a φ)) f, h, PL
(j) LDiiP (M a ¬(M a φ)) ↔ ¬(M a (M a φ)) Theorem 2.8.1
(k) LDiiP ¬(M a ¬(M a φ)) ↔ M a (M a φ) j, PL
(l) LDiiP (M a φ) → M a (M a φ) i, k, PL; (proof transitivity)
(m) LDiiP (M a (M a φ)) ↔ M a φ a, l, PL.
(vii) (a) LDiiP b kM → ((M b (M a φ)) → M a φ) epistemic truthfulness, PL
(b) LDiiP b kM → ((M b (M a ¬φ)) → M a ¬φ) dito a
(c) LDiiP b kM → (¬(M a ¬φ) → ¬(M b (M a ¬φ))) b, PL
(d) LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ ¬(M a φ) Theorem 2.8.1
(e) LDiiP ¬(M a ¬φ) ↔ (M a φ) d, PL
(f) LDiiP b kM → ((M a φ) → ¬(M b (M a ¬φ))) c, e, PL
(g) LDiiP (M b (M a ¬φ)) ↔ M b ¬(M a φ) d, regularity
(h) LDiiP ¬(M b (M a ¬φ)) ↔ ¬(M b ¬(M a φ)) g, PL
(i) LDiiP b kM → ((M a φ) → ¬(M b ¬(M a φ))) f, h, PL
(j) LDiiP (M b ¬(M a φ)) ↔ ¬(M b (M a φ)) Theorem 2.8.1
(k) LDiiP ¬(M b ¬(M a φ)) ↔ M b (M a φ) j, PL
(l) LDiiP b kM → ((M a φ) → M b (M a φ)) i, k, PL
(m) LDiiP b kM → ((M b (M a φ)) ↔ M a φ) a, l, PL.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.17
A.4.1 Axiomatic soundness
Deﬁnition A.1 [Truth & Validity [1]]
• The formula φ ∈ L is true (or satisﬁed) in the model (S,V) at the state s ∈ S
:iﬀ (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisﬁable in the model (S,V) :iﬀ there is s ∈ S such that
(S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is globally true (or globally satisﬁed) in the model (S,V), written
(S,V) |= φ, :iﬀ for all s ∈ S, (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisﬁable :iﬀ there is a model (S,V) and a state s ∈ S such
that (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is valid, written |= φ, :iﬀ for all models (S,V), (S,V) |= φ.
Proposition A.2 (Admissibility of LDiiP-speciﬁc axioms and rules)
(i) |= M a a kM
(ii) |= (M a (φ → φ′)) → ((M a φ) → M a φ′)
(iii) |= (M a φ) → (a kM → φ)
(iv) |= ¬(M a⊥)
(v) |= (M a φ) ∨M a ¬φ
(vi) If |= φ then |= M a φ
Proof. 1 follows directly from the epistemic-image property of MRa; 2 and 6 hold
by the fact that LiiP has a standard Kripke-semantics; 3 follows directly from
the conditional reﬂexivity of MRa, and 4 and 5 from the seriality/totality and the
determinism/functionality of MRa, respectively. 
A.4.2 Semantic completeness
For all φ ∈ L, if |= φ then LDiiP φ.
Proof. Let
• W designate the set of all maximally LDiiP-consistent sets 7
• for all w,w′ ∈ W, w MCa w′ :iﬀ { φ ∈ L | M a φ ∈ w } ⊆ w′
• for all w ∈ W , w ∈ VC(P ) :iﬀ P ∈ w.
7 * A set W of LDiiP-formulas is maximally LDiiP-consistent :iﬀ W is LDiiP-consistent and W has no
proper superset that is LDiiP-consistent. A set W of LDiiP-formulas is LDiiP-consistent :iﬀ W is not
LDiiP-inconsistent. A set W of LDiiP-formulas is LDiiP-inconsistent :iﬀ there is a ﬁnite W ′ ⊆ W such that
((
∧
W ′) → ⊥) ∈ LDiiP. Any LDiiP-consistent set can be extended to a maximally LDiiP-consistent set by
means of the Lindenbaum Construction [9, Page 90]. A set is maximally LDiiP-consistent if and only if the
set of logical-equivalence classes of the set is an ultraﬁlter of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of LDiiP [31,
Page 351]. The canonical frame is isomorphic to the ultraﬁlter frame of that Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
[31, Page 352].
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Then MC := (W , {MCa}M∈M,a∈A,VC) designates the canonical model for LDiiP.
Following Fitting [9, Section 2.2], the following useful property of MC,
for all φ ∈ L and w ∈ W , φ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ,
the so-called Truth Lemma, can be proved by induction on the structure of φ:
(i) Base case (φ := P for P ∈ P). For all w ∈ W , P ∈ w if and only ifMC, w |= P ,
by deﬁnition of VC.
(ii) Inductive step (φ := ¬φ′ for φ′ ∈ L). Suppose that for all w ∈ W , φ′ ∈ w if and
only if MC, w |= φ′. Further let w ∈ W . Then, ¬φ′ ∈ w if and only if φ′ ∈ w
— w is consistent — if and only if MC, w |= φ′ — by the induction hypothesis
— if and only if MC, w |= ¬φ′.
(iii) Inductive step (φ := φ′ ∧ φ′′ for φ′, φ′′ ∈ L). Suppose that for all w ∈ W,
φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ′, and that for all w ∈ W , φ′′ ∈ w if and
only if MC, w |= φ′′. Further let w ∈ W . Then, φ′ ∧ φ′′ ∈ w if and only if
(φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w), because w is maximal. Now suppose that φ′ ∈ w and
φ′′ ∈ w. Hence, MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′, by the induction hypotheses,
and thus MC, w |= φ′ ∧ φ′′. Conversely, suppose that MC, w |= φ′ ∧ φ′′. Then,
MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′. Hence, φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w, by the induction
hypotheses. Thus, (φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w) if and only if (MC, w |= φ′ and
MC, w |= φ′′). Whence φ′∧φ′′ ∈ w if and only if (MC, w |= φ′ andMC, w |= φ′′),
by transitivity.
(iv) Inductive step (φ := M a φ′ for M ∈ M, a ∈ A, and φ′ ∈ L).
4.1 for all w ∈ W , φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ′ ind. hyp.
4.2 w ∈ W hyp.
4.3 M a φ′ ∈ w hyp.
4.4 w′ ∈ W hyp.
4.5 w MCa w
′ hyp.
4.6 { φ′′ ∈ L | M a φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ w′ 4.5
4.7 φ′ ∈ { φ′′ ∈ L | M a φ′′ ∈ w } 4.3, 4.6
4.8 φ′ ∈ w′ 4.6, 4.7
4.9 MC, w
′ |= φ′ 4.1, 4.4, 4.8
4.10 if w MCa w
′ then MC, w′ |= φ′ 4.5–4.9
4.11 for all w′ ∈ W, if w MCa w′ then MC, w′ |= φ′ 4.4–4.10
4.12 MC, w |= M a φ′ 4.11
4.13 M a φ′ ∈ w hyp.
4.14 F = { φ′′ ∈ L | M a φ′′ ∈ w } ∪ {¬φ′} hyp.
4.15 F is LDiiP-inconsistent hyp.
4.16 there is {M a φ1, . . . ,M a φn} ⊆ w such that
LDiiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn ∧ ¬φ′) → ⊥ 4.14, 4.15
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4.17 {M a φ1, . . . ,M a φn} ⊆ w and
LDiiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn ∧ ¬φ′) → ⊥ hyp.
4.18 LDiiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn) → φ′ 4.17
4.19 LDiiP (M a (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn)) → M a φ′ 4.18, regularity
4.20 LDiiP ((M a φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (M a φn)) → M a φ′ 4.19
4.21 M a φ′ ∈ w 4.17, 4.20, w is maximal
4.22 false 4.13, 4.21
4.23 false 4.16, 4.17–4.22
4.24 F is LDiiP-consistent 4.15–4.23
4.25 there is w′ ⊇ F s.t. w′ is maximally LDiiP-consistent 4.24
4.26 F ⊆ w′ and w′ is maximally LDiiP-consistent hyp.
4.27 { φ′′ ∈ L | M a φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ F 4.14
4.28 { φ′′ ∈ L | M a φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ w′ 4.26, 4.27
4.29 w MCa w
′ 4.28
4.30 w′ ∈ W 4.26
4.31 ¬φ′ ∈ F 4.14
4.32 ¬φ′ ∈ w′ 4.26, 4.31
4.33 φ′ ∈ w′ 4.26 (w′ is LDiiP-consistent), 4.32
4.34 MC, w
′ |= φ′ 4.1, 4.33
4.35 there is w′ ∈ W s.t. w MCa w′ and MC, w′ |= φ′ 4.29, 4.34
4.36 MC, w |= M a φ′ 4.35
4.37 MC, w |= M a φ′ 4.25, 4.26–4.36
4.38 MC, w |= M a φ′ 4.14–4.37
4.39 M a φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= M a φ′ 4.3–4.12, 4.13–4.38
4.40 for all w ∈ W , M a φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= M a φ′ 4.2–4.39
With the Truth Lemma we can now prove that for all φ ∈ L, if LDiiP φ then
|= φ. Let φ ∈ L, and suppose that LDiiP φ. Thus, {¬φ} is LDiiP-consistent, and
can be extended to a maximally LDiiP-consistent set w, i.e., ¬φ ∈ w ∈ W. Hence
MC, w |= ¬φ, by the Truth Lemma. Thus: MC, w |= φ, MC |= φ, and |= φ. That
is, MC is a universal (for all φ ∈ L) counter-model (if φ is a non-theorem then MC
falsiﬁes φ).
We are left to prove that MC is also an LDiiP-model. So let us instantiate our
data mining operator cla (cf. Page 13) on W by letting for all w ∈ W
msgsa(w) := { M | a kM ∈ w },
and let us prove that:
(i) there is w′ ∈ W such that w MCa w′
(ii) if w MCa w
′ and w MCa w′′ then w′ = w′′
(iii) if M ∈ clwa (∅) then w MCa w
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(iv) if w MCa w
′ then M ∈ clw′a (∅).
For (1), let w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, and suppose that M a φ ∈ w. For the sake of
deriving the contrary, further suppose that φ ∈ w. Hence ¬φ ∈ w because w is max-
imal, and thus φ → ⊥ ∈ w. Hence (M a φ) → M a⊥ ∈ w by regularity. Hence
M a⊥ ∈ w by the ﬁrst supposition and modus ponens. Hence ¬(M a⊥) ∈ w be-
cause w is consistent. Yet since w is maximal, ¬(M a⊥) ∈ w (proof consistency).
Contradiction. Hence w is actually a w′ such that φ ∈ w′.
For (2), let us ﬁrst prove the following, so-called Reﬂection Lemma:
M a φ ∈ w if and only if M a ¬φ ∈ w.
So suppose that
• M a φ ∈ w. Hence ¬(M a φ) ∈ w because w is maximal. Since w is maximal,
¬(M a φ) → M a ¬φ ∈ w (negation completeness). Hence M a ¬φ ∈ w by
modus ponens.
• M a ¬φ ∈ w. Since w is maximal, (M a ¬φ) → ¬(M a ¬¬φ) ∈ w (proof
consistency). Hence ¬(M a ¬¬φ) ∈ w by modus ponens. Since w is maxi-
mal, φ → ¬¬φ ∈ w. Hence (M a φ) → M a ¬¬φ ∈ w by regularity. Hence
¬(M a ¬¬φ) → ¬(M a φ) ∈ w by contraposition. Hence ¬(M a φ) ∈ w by
modus ponens. Hence M a φ ∈ w because w is consistent.
Now for (2), let w,w′, w′′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCa w′ and w MCa w′′. That
is, (for all φ ∈ L, if M a φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′) and (for all φ ∈ L, if M a φ ∈ w then
φ ∈ w′′). Now let φ ∈ L and suppose that
• φ ∈ w′. Hence ¬φ ∈ w′ because w is consistent. Hence M a ¬φ ∈ w by particu-
larisation of the ﬁrst supposition with ¬φ and modus tollens. Hence M a φ ∈ w
by the Reﬂection Lemma. Hence φ ∈ w′′ by the second supposition and modus
ponens.
• φ ∈ w′′. Hence φ ∈ w′—symmetrically.
For (3), let w ∈ W and suppose that M ∈ clwa (∅). Hence a kM ∈ w due to the
maximality of w. Further suppose that M a φ ∈ w. Since w is maximal,
(M a φ) → (a kM → φ) ∈ w (epistemic truthfulness).
Hence, a kM → φ ∈ w, and φ ∈ w, by consecutive modus ponens.
For (4), let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCa w′. That is, for all φ ∈ L, if
M a φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Since w is maximal,
M a a kM ∈ w (self-knowledge).
Hence a kM ∈ w′ by particularisation of the supposition, and thus M ∈ clw′a (∅) by
the deﬁnition of clw
′
a .

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